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POETS, POSTSTRUCTURALISTS, AND 
THE NUMINOUS 
Robert Lumsden 
There arc broadly speaking two possible points of view concerning the 
relation of language to Lhe numinous; that it can, if with difficulty, be 
truly indicated; and that any attempts to speak of it will be ineffectual, 
and perhaps self-deluding. 
Variations of the second position can be found in a number of 
linguist-philosophers and critical theorists. Jacques Lacan, for example, 
is rightly described as thinking that "the quest for the pristine, word-
free structures of thought ... is frivolous". 1 In contrast to his master, 
Freud, Lacan's concept of language is not of a semi-transparent veil 
through which the real may be discerned, however dimly, but of a 
medium by which the very idea of truth itself undergoes a continual 
reformation. When we recall that this language is - in Lacan's 
description of it - pervaded at every point by desire which can neither 
be satisfied nor openly declared, it is clear that 'numinous', far from 
naming that which is truly extra-ordinary, can be nothing more than a 
disguised wish given transcendental status. 
A representative of the opposite camp, Georges Bataille, musing on 
some connections between romanticism and religion, writes: 
Literature, connected since romanticism with the decadence of 
religion in that it tends to lay a discreet claim to the heritage 
of religion, is not so much cognate with the content of religion 
as it is with the content of mysticism which, incidentally, is an 
almost asocial aspect of religion. Similarly, mysticism is closer 
to the truth than I can possibly say. By mysticism I do not 
mean those systems of thought on which this vague name is 
conferred. I refer, rather, to the 'mystical experience' to those 
'mystical states' experienced in solitude. In these states we see 
a different truth to that which is concerned with the perception 
of objects, or indeed of the subject, connected, as it is, with 
the intellectual consequences of perception. But this is not a 
formal truth. Coherent discussion cannot account for it. It 
would be incommunicable if we could not approach it in two 
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ways: through poetry and through the description of those 
conditions by which one arrives at these states.2 
I would like for a moment to focus on the last part of this excerpt. 
There, Bataille does two things: he credits the veracity of what he calls 
'the mystical experience'; and he assumes that such experiences are 
communicable, by way of poetry, or through "the description of those 
conditions by which one arrives at these states". Not in terms of 
"coherent discusssion", that is to say. 
Both versions of human consciousness in its relation to what seems 
to lie beyond the merely human are defined by an idea of language 
which each presumes to be true. But Lacan and Bataille, in their 
'phrasing' of that relation, in presenting that presumption as self-
evident, reverse each other's grammar. Those of Bataille's persuasion 
believe that what he calls 'the mystical', and I shall call 'the numinous' 
or 'the divine',3 supercedes rationalizing expression - 'coherent 
discussion'. While those who incline Lacan's way will see such notions 
as 'the mystical' or 'the numinous' as being contained by language -
inscribed within it completely, and allowed a patina of mystification 
only by the dissembling operations of desire. 
I want eventually to depart from this sceptical post-structuralist tum 
which I have used Lacan to typify,4 and make two proposals. At the 
last, that certain post-structuralist approaches, in particular Derrida's, 
may indeed be made to operate as "descriptions of the conditions by 
which one arrives at mystical or numinous states" - though 'pre-
conditions' would perhaps be more accurate, prologues to what is 
hardly to be admitted as possible within the terms of their own 
arguments. I will also outline, before arriving at that point, some of the 
quite different ways in which certain poet-metaphysicians, for want of 
a better phrase, also move one towards an intimation of what an 
experience of the numinous would be like. 
My aim in general is to argue that there are important points of 
connection between the attention given to the numinous by a certain 
type of poet, and Derrida's post-structuralist explanations, whose 
appeal is ultimately to the conceptual, even though he uses reason 
against itself in a kind of ju-jitsu whereby the pretension of intellect to 
comprehensive knowledge is wrestled to a stand-still. 
Perhaps it can be granted, from our post-Kantian, post-New 
Criticism perspeclive, that both positions, as a living Adept describes 
it,5 do compel a presumption of (or about) Being. Given that such a 
presumption must be made, there is a crucial difference between one 
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who works with binary oppositions in order to question the ultimate 
validity of the way of thinking they represent - Derrida's position as I 
read him - and those who try to find ways to dispense with bioariness 
altogether - my poet-metaphysicians, as I shall take them. 
At this first mention of this group of poets, it will be useful to 
distinguish several positions among them. F >r aU their diffen.:nces, 
what they hold in ommon is an impulse to turn language from 
binariness (preferring 'binary' to 'duaHstic' when Lhe focus is on 
language rather than the experience it repre ents) , and a refusal of that 
grounding in logic at which Bataille hint . Their appeal, also - though 
Bataille does n t quite make this point - is fundamentally to the 
aifective, a veneration of that which joins with its objects of 
c ntemplation, dis olving boundaries. This faculty they hold to be 
inimical to reason, which they think, achieves decisivenes by installing 
separaliveness in human consciousness. 
In some, though, the circumventing of conceptual mind goes no 
further than a movement back to sheer, thoughtless, perception -
Blake's 'cleansing' of the doors of perception, for instance, or Keats' 
cry for a life of 'sensations rather than thoughts'. But there are others-
sometimes they are the sa me apostles of perception in a different 
mood - the Kea ts who in the 'Ode to a Grecian Urn' invites the urn to 
'Pipe to the spirit, ditties of no tone', for example - who invoke an 
awareness which is prior even to perceptual mind. 
Such poets - I will give several examples shortly - at such lime , 
tend not to embark upon the visionary voyage ' inward', or at least not 
to remain satisfied with it - as Blake is satisfied, in his prophetic books 
because such a journeying appears to them to be a return to a 
disguised version of the dualism enshrined in ratiomtlist exp'lanations, 
in which the seeker remains forever divorced [rom what is sought, as 
signifier is from signified, grammatical subject from its object, and 
original meaning from de ·criplions of it. 
Having io eifect just characterized Wordsworth's revulsion at the 
idea of 'murdering to dissect' - feeling, for him, being a value because 
it tends to dissolve dualities, and reason a dubious thing because it 
tends to establish differences as though they were irrefutable principles 
- I want to consider a passage from The Prelude, as an example of the 
way in which he tries to bring binaries together, making them register 
affectively as though they were actually one: 
for I would walk alone, 
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Under the quiet stars, and at that time 
Have felt whate'er there is of power in sound 
To breathe an elevated mood, by form 
Or image unprofaned, and I would stand, 
If the night blackened with a coming storm, 
Beneath some rock, listening to notes that are 
The ghostly language of the ancient earth, 
Or make their dim abode in distant winds. 
Thence did I drink the visionary power; 
And deem not profitless those fleeting moods 
Of shadowy exultation; not for this, 
That they are kindred to our purer mind 
And intellectual life; but that the soul, 
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity, whereto 
With growing faculties still growing, feeling still 
That whatever point they gain, they yet 
Have something to pursue. 
(Bk 11, pp.302-22) 
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I want to focus upon a series of connected phrases in this passage by 
which Wordsworth makes fainter the denotative boundaries of the 
language he uses: 'elevated' 'unprofaned', 'shadowy exultation' 
'possible sublimity' and 'aspire'. Wordsworth's 'real time' situation is 
that of a seeker submerged by what he wants to admire He stands 
"under the ... stars", and also "beneath some rock". He is not only 
separated from these significant parts of the world to which he is 
trying to relate, but is quite dominated by them. However, he turns 
this position of (topographical and existential) inferiority around, by 
moving the reader between a series of concepts whose nuances modify, 
and even cancel, their denotations. To run through these shifts in sense 
more rapidly than Wordsworth allows in his verse: 'elevated' signifies 
'morally or intellectually on a higher plane', but also 'raised above the 
ground or other surface'; 'profane' signifies' impure, defiled', but also 
'debased'; and 'debased' signifies 'to lower in status, esteem, quality or 
character'; (it also invokes 'profound', I think, signifying 'coming from 
or situated at, a depth'); 'exultation' signifies 'to leap for joy' (L 
exsultare 'to leap up'); and 'sublime' signifies 'lofty, great or exalted in 
thought', and also 'to elevate', from L sub - under, up to + limen -
threshold, "under, up to (the) threshold". 
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Wordsworth's topos, spiritually speaking, is thus displaced from the 
inferior location he provides for himself in his report of where he 
stands. (It was Shelley who typified this initial place of recognition as 
"something wrong about us, as we stand"). He tells us that as a seeker 
for union, he is separated from the great things he contemplates. That 
is how the verse works denotatively - as a placement of the speaker's 
apparent life. But the connotative play his verse sets in train, 'what it 
tells' us, subconsciously, is another story. It tells us that down may be 
up, and is indeed on the point of becoming so; that the very moment 
of standing lowered (or 'debased', or 'profaned'), is also the moment of 
being 'exalted', or 'elevated' . So that, to be 'profound' is also, in terms 
of the way one is made to feel about what is said, paradoxically to find 
oneself "coming up from a depth" (an 'inferior' position). To stand 
under the stars adoring, is by that fact to be raised up into spiritual 
conjunction with them: to be 'sub-limed'. 
Wordsworth's 'argument' for the possible non-duality of experience 
(he speaks only of a "possible sublimity"), that is to say, is directed 
towards winning a subliminal assent from the reader. And this is 
attempted by connotative play which transgresses several basic, 
rational "givens" - up/down = good/bad.6 
I have begun to consider some types of poetry as communications 
made direct to the feeling centre, which are, also, denials of the 
mastery of conceptual mind. In itself this is hardly a new position for 
critics of literature to take, insofar as criticism, especially by poets 
themselves from Wordsworth and Shelley to Houseman to Stevens to 
the Beats and beyond, has tended to see human well-being, no less, 
disturbed by a war which rages between two antagonistic modes of 
consciousness, represented by intellect and feeling. I am not sure, even 
so, that what is actually experienced in the poetry itself as an 
unutterable schism, has been sufficiently noted, nor that its implications 
for the place of the poet in society, and his or her version of what 
society might be, are often given their due weight. In any case, my 
interest is not so much with those battle lines which poets have been 
inclined to draw up, but with those places where they try to step 
across them. 
In T.S. Eliot one finds a poet much more overtly aware than 
Wordsworth of the need to heal those divisions - between thought and 
feeling, man and society, human and divine - which seem to be re-
established by his every attempt to make sense of his existence. Four 
Quartets, in particular, as well as deserving to be read as one of the 
early Modernist ur-texts, sets up a commentary on its own attempt to 
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'purify the language of the tribe' which ought to be read as post-
modernist, I suggest. But it also faces in another, more venerable 
direction, looking back to a tradition in English metaphysical poetry,7 
in which consciousness expressed as feeling situates itself over against 
the numinous, sometimes as erotic or bodily play. (In Eliot's case the 
eroticism is treated negatively, or supressed.) 
Both of these perspectives the post-modernist and the 
'metaphysical', converge in Eliot's meditations upon the language by 
which he must struggle to convey his sense of a pre-linguistic, or supra-
linguistic state. The following passage, for example - from Section V, 
of 'East Coker' - goes much further than lamenting the poor fit 
language makes with that timeless sense he has tried to articulate. For 
Eliot tells us both that language is useless in trying to convey anything 
worth reporting, and that anything he might manage to say well can be 
recognized by that fact as not worth saying at all. No better ducking-
stool was ever made by poet for himself: 
and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure. 
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which 
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, 
Undisciplined squads of emotion. 
What I am calling a 'post-modernist' despair (which emerges 
particularly here in a distaste for affective messiness) in Eliot is clearer 
in this particular passage than the other facet I have mentioned, his 
sensitivity to a realm - for him, a domain of signification, rather than 
'pure' existence, I think - beyond language. This second aspect is given 
more prominence, though, in another meditation on language earlier in 
the poem- Section V of 'Burnt Norton': 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time; but that which is only living 
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
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Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
Not the stillness of the violin, while the note lasts, 
Not that only, but the co-existence, 
Or say that the end precedes the beginning, 
And the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end. 
And all is always now. Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. 
There is a distress at language itself here, certainly. But this is, too, a 
description of what words may accomplish, after they are done with 
one, or after one has done noticing what they fail to perform. 
They may, Eliot thinks, indicate: a "stillness" beyond post-modernist 
self-containment, which he (later in the same passage) equates both 
with timelessness and with love. We might note in passing Eliot's debt 
to Keats in this matter - especially the hardly accidental connection, 
given Eliot's praise of that poet in his essay 'Shelley and Keats',8 of the 
"unheard music" of the first part of 'Burnt Norton' with Keats' "ditties 
with no tone" in the 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'. Keats' appeal to the Urn 
to 'speak' silently a non-linguistic truth, is of course made verbally - it 
'sounds', from within his poem and in the reader's head - and it is this 
troublesome division between the speaker and his art which is the 
'deep' subject both of Keats' 'Ode', and, I suggest, Four Quartets, 
one which both poets try to resolve by proposing that very dividedness 
as the subject of their meditation. 
But I am also suggesting that Eliot's dis-ease in the presence of his 
own speaking, and his dissatisfaction at the entire conceptualizing 
mode, are framed by another more venerable idea of what language 
might accomplish. It is the idea that the marking of a limit also 
necessarily suggests a 'beyond' to the line one draws, a substantial 
formlessness sketched in (or 'echoed' in, since both Keats and Eliot use 
the idea of a soundless sound) by those very boundaries which seem to 
establish an ultimate separation between things. Eliot's Chinese jar 
suggests an ultimately significant something beyond itself, precisely 
because it finishes; or, because it finishes precisely. 
Just as Wordsworth never entirely leaves behind the division 
between mind and nature, body and spirit, and the two functions or 
types of mind (represented by 'first vision', and 'philosophic mind')9 
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which provide the goad to his meditation upon the numinous, Eliot's 
fitful vision is associated with an inwardness which tends to disregard 
or even despise the physical, and establish consciousness at its most 
sublime as a kind of semi-spectral, bodiless feeling state.10 As such, it 
re-inscribes another version of the duality I have been considering, one 
in which visionary fascination with inner states produces a kind of 
divorce from the body. 
This type of address to the numinous, in which a kernel of god-
awareness is held in mind like a jewel in a casket, is a feature of most 
metaphysical and religious traditions, and I offer an example from a 
section of Robert Bly's book News of the Universe: poems of twofold 
consciousness (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1980). In my view, 
the first of the two poems I quote from this section, by Kabir, the 15th 
century Indian poet, does not achieve the non-dualism of which Bly 
speaks in his introduction, but seems rather to reinscribe the kind of 
dividedness it tries to speak against: 
The Clay Jug 
Inside this clay jug there are canyons and pine mountains, 
and the maker of canyons and pine mountains! 
All seven oceans are inside, and hundreds of millions of stars. 
The acid that tests gold is there, and the one who judges 
jewels. 
And the music from the strings that no one touches, and the 
source of all water. 
If you want the truth, I will tell you the truth: 
Friend, listen: the God whom I love is inside. 
Perhaps the most striking thing about this, and the poems which 
follow, compared with the Eliot and Wordsworth passages, is its 
simplicity and directness. For Kabir, language evidently is no opaque 
addition to the world, a grafting-on which never quite 'takes', but as 
much a given of his experience as a clay jug or pine mountains. 
A second thing about this poem which also characterizes each of 
those I will instance from this point: it takes it as read that it is the 
way in which personality is presented which provides a key to the 
mysterious connectedness of which it speaks. This is true of all the 
truly non-dualistic poems I have encountered: their speakers all 
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presume that personality, the locus of dilemma for the post-modernist, 
even in its deceptive appearances, can be stated plainly; that there is 
no need for one aspect of the post-modern 'turn', which is to say, the 
production of a rhetoric which will track mimetically the strategies of 
self as it tries to seize substantiality by its own cleverness. 
Kabir's poem, in contrast - and it seems to me to be true of many 
which try to capture in words an experience of what I have been 
calling the numinous - does finally re-instate divisions between an 
(object) world which is the product of the divine, and an inner 
experience which gives that world its genesis and value. Everything, in 
the end of this poem and therefore through all the moments which 
may be imagined to precede it, is tied up around this in-forming 
presence, this inwardly contained token of divinity: "the God whom I 
love is inside". 
According to the poet -metaphysicians to whom I now turn, it is 
precisely such a separation, however minimal, sublimed, or redolent 
with the backwash of the Other, which must always limit one's 
coherence with the numinous, however astonishing the vision of 
completeness, however close one feels oneself to the extraordinary. 
Even to come brilliantly near, for these writers, is still, always, never 
to be near enough. (The third Ch'an patriarch put the the essence of 
this matter well: "Make a hairsbreadth difference and heaven and earth 
are set apart")Y 
In the poem which follows, however, - 'Fish' - by the 
contemporary Zen Buddhist Shinkichi Takahashi, there does seem to 
me to be a resolution of dualisms, which, as I have already suggested, 
is based upon a play with the idea of personality. By the poem's end, 
the writer's feeling of selfhood as separate from the world's 'selvings', 
has been so undermined that a conclusion which might previously have 
seemed no more than whimsical or bizarre, is felt as an amazing 
obviousness which one had, unaccountably, overlooked: 
I hold a newspaper, reading. 
Suddenly my hands become cow ears. 
They turn into Pusan, the South Korean port. 
Lying on a mat 
Spread on the bankside stones, 
I fell asleep. 
But a willow leaf, breeze stirred, 
Brushed my ear. 
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I remained just as I was, 
Near the murmurous water. 
When young there was a girl 
Who became a fish for me. 
Whenever I wanted fish 
Broiled in salt, I'd summon her. 
She'd get down on her stomach 
To be sun-cooked on the stones. 
And she was always ready! 
Alas, she no longer comes to me. 
An old benighted drake, 
I hobble homeward. 
But look, my drake feet become horse hoofs! 
Now they drop off 
And, stretching marvellously 
Become the tracks of the Tokaido Railway Line. 
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It is notable that the poem which follows this in Bly's collection -'Snail' 
by the same poet, in which the same point of view is attempted, is not 
as successful as 'Fish', because - I think - it uses a third person 
narration. Somehow, it is an understanding of the ego-'i, that apparent 
centre in which all distinctions arise, which has to be re-arranged 
before the desired sense of oneness may 'bleed through'. 
At the conclusion of 'Fish', Takahashi introduces the ultimate threat 
to this self sense - death - in the gentler guise of decrepitude, only to 
bury that in a humourous statement of the ultimate identity of 
capriciously appearing particulars. Drake's feet equals ·horse hooves 
equals a railway line equals - anything else whatsoever which pops up, 
obviously. Only laughter is appropriate; relief from the ordinary clench 
of self at something momentous which Takahashi has made seem so 
ordinarily plausible. 
In the following poems, from Da Free John's collection Crazy Da 
Must Sing, Inclined to His Weaker Side (Clearlake, California: The 
Dawn Horse Press, 1982) this equality of things arising, including the 
self -sense in the numinous and as one of Its manifestations, is even 
more compellingly conveyed. It is accomplished, as it is in Takahashi's 
poem, because the writer insists upon the fullness of the personal, 
before going on to proclaim that all things are, equally, Other as well 
as oneself. The self-sense is not denied, that it is to say, as it may tend 
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to be in Buddhist and Advaitic practice alike, 12 - not to mention Eliot's 
poetry, which has behind it his doctrine of the impersonality of the 
poet - but proclaimed as one among a series of arising forms, each of 
which may be re-cognized as an expression of the Real, each of them 
at once immanent and transcendent. 
For one speaking from this position, maya (forms as illusory) has 
no meaning except as appearances presenting themselves to a limited 
point of view. And even these forms of dualistic perceiving are 
understood as forms in Consciousness, all of which are to be 
permitted; understood; but not seized upon. For such a speaker, 
terminology shifts irretrievably from the 'coherent'. 
For example - and crucially - it will be both true and not true that 
'samsara and nirvana are the same': true for the one who speaks from 
that realized 'existence-place', 13 but not true for one who has not yet 
realized that state. That is to say, 'samsara and nirvana are the same' 
cannot be hrougbt to pass by rial, neither by linguistic strategy -
language in ullerance- nor by thought- language privately rehearsed.14 
Indeed, the thinking and speaking of such philosophies is one of the 
principal ways in which one may prevent the admission into ordinary 
awareness of one's always present grounding in lhc numinous:15 
#11 
I stand before you in all my forms. 
Do not expect me to appear in 
just one light. 
To understand the differences is not 
to stupefy the world. 
It is to know that the world is 
conscious. 
As you see, 
I do not hesitate to become 
anything. 
One who understands 
enjoys my fearlessness. 
He grasps the humor of this present state. 
He is the organ of my sighs. 
#3 
I don't care anymore 
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to keep silent about it. 
I have never been born or 
died, but I have been 
conscious of you without 
interruption, always. 
You are my own form. 
All of this is my own form. 
I tell you unequivocally, 
all of this is my own form. 
There is only one experience, 
one event. Creation is one 
thing, one form. 
It is my own, and your 
mind is a shattering 
of light by which I see you. 
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These two aspects, an undoing of the self sense, and a humour or play 
in realization, are characteristic of many evocations of this state, in 
which an all-pervading presence is gathered into consciousness. In 
some way which cannot be described as completely as it may be 
experienced, the merely human is felt to have always also been that 
transcendent Other which was previously read off from the world as 
separate from it, or to stand over against it. To underline these points 
of difference between 'metaphysical' poetry of this sort, and that of 
poets such as Kabir: neither of these things - humour/6 and conclusive 
dissolution of the boundaries of self - seems to mark the great mystic 
poets, insofar as their journey is presented repeatedly in terms of a 
quest without resolution in human terms. Inspiring though they may 
be, lightness of touch in respect of their sense of themselves is not a 
notable feature of Henry Vaughan's writings, nor, to take one other 
example which is typical in its way of this kind of extraordinariness, in 
St. John of the Cross. 
The divisions between self and not-self, too, in the work of such 
writers, rather than being dissolved, seem to be re-inforced by a 
general placement of attention upon the inward, visionary, journey,17 
and, even, by the very insistence upon the relative greatness of 
whatever is pictured as exceeding the merely human. 
I come to my argument for the value of certain post-structuralist 
writings by way of this notion of humour, which I read as having 
important points in common with post-structuralist play. I want to 
suggest that such critical writings, somewhat in the manner of a secular 
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spiritual exercise, can bring one to the point at which the ordinary self-
sense is, at least, made ripe for dissolution. In doing so, I have as my 
point of departure an essay in which the writer, David Loy, with 
unusual erudition and sympathy, argues that Derrida, in particular, 
takes only the first two of three steps completed in Madhyamika 
Buddhism in dissolving one's disturbed dependence upon self-
presence. 18 
In David Loy's view, the end-point of Derrida's discourse against 
logocentrism remains bound to the limitation it argues against, insofar 
as it is still "inscribed within an endless recirculation of concepts, even 
if (Derrida does) not grasp at the ones that are supposed to bring 
Being into our grasp." Thus, according to Loy, insofar as we lend 
ourselves to Derrida's deconstruction, we: 
still retain a self -existing ground of our own (language as a 
whole) which is therefore anxious about its feared lack-of-
ground, because the relation between language thought and 
the rest of the still-objectified universe remains unresolved and 
unresolvable in this fashion. 
The key elements of this critique are the idea that Derrida's discourse 
always returns one to an "endless recirculation of concepts"; which in 
turn sets up an anxiety about realization (or liberation, or 
enlightenment); which in its turn guarantees that this realiz.ation will 
not occur. (There is a third proposition in Loy's argument, which is 
that Madhyamika Buddhism is more conducive than Derrida's to a 
"deconstruction of self-existence", and therefore to liberation from false 
identification with the egoic or self-sense. I am not concerned here to 
try to consider the relative merits of a Madyhamika deconstruction 
against the Derridaean model - if I were, I should probably agree that 
the Buddhist practice is the more profound. Rather, [ am arguing for 
the value of Derrida 's criticism in itself.) 
Jt seems to me that Derrida can be taken in a way which is almost 
the reverse of Loy's reading of him. I mean that, far from returning 
the reader to an endlessly recirculating conceptual series which 
exacerbates the desire for a significant resting-place, even as it creates 
the anxious knowledge that such a place of rest is impossible, Derrida's 
work can promote a peculiar openness, the charged sense of an 
unspeakable immanence always about to come over into language; an 
expectation, consequent upon the exhaustion of trust in language, and 
similar in its mood to Simone Weil's 'waiting'. I am aware that what I 
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am now saying will appear in some quarters as outright heresy - and I 
suspect, were he to be asked, that this might also be the response of 
Derrida himself. Fortunately, Derrida's insistence in a number of 
places that his own discourses, like all others, can be construed only 
insofar as they, too, are deconstructed, provides authority from within 
his writings to promote this present heterodoxy. 
Drawing upon the best known early revisionist of Derrida, Paul de 
Man, the matter can be put in this way: all texts, according to Derrida, 
are implicitly deconstructive of their own arguments. De Man adds 
that those moments at which they most offer themselves for 
deconstruction will be those where their authors are least able to see 
that this is what they are about. (Typically, the authors whom Derrida 
and de Man choose to critique, are those whose modes of discourse 
undermine their major premises - Rousseau, Saussure, Husserl, and so 
on.) 
What I am suggesting is that Derrida's attack upon the 
transcendental signified likewise allows back in - indeed, serves - the 
concept of the numinous (which I do not feel he distinguishes from a 
'transcendental signified') by means of the very discourse he unfolds to 
argue against such a thing. And that he is, as both he and de Man have 
taught us that one must be, most unaware of this fact (textually, at 
least) where it is most actively occurring. 
This preparation for an always imminent re-entry of the numinous 
seems to me to be effected in two ways by Derrida. Formally; Derrida 
sometimes arranges his texts so that they compel the reader to enact 
the unceasing proliferation of meanings which is (also) one of his 
principal themes. An obvious example is Glas; another, Nietzsche's 
Spurs, in which a commentary by Derrida is laid alongside a text of 
Nietzche's, the one moving gradually out of an easy alignment with the 
other as the two proceed, so that, eventually, the reader becomes 
acutely aware of his or her part in bringing the two into a meaningful 
conjunction. 
An analogy for the feeling this sets up might be of a film which 
slips more and more out of 'sync' with its sub-titles, so that, eventually, 
in order to make sense at all, one would be forced to abandon all idea 
of relating text and subtitles to a common origin, a 'primal scene' of 
meaning, and instead concentrate upon reading the subtitles as given 
moment by moment, in a manufactured accordance with the scene 
with which they happened to appear, however 'illogical', or 
'inappropriate' that co-occurrence might seem. Or, one might prefer to 
think of this strategy of Derrida's as a pushing of a non-ideogrammatic 
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language towards the iconic. 
Whatever description one finds most helpful, the impact of such 
arrangements - on this reader, at least - is of a playful, humorous 
offering to experience of the notion that meaning must be received as 
a wanton proliferation of forms. And this is not, or at least need not 
be necessarily, experienced with the kind of anxiety Loy suggests, but, 
may, at least, induce a relaxation of one's impulse to search for a "non-
existent ground" of meaning in language. (If not prakriti experienced as 
Purusha, then prakriti charged with expectation that Purusha mighl at 
any moment also appear). 
The second way in which Derrida seems to me to direct one's 
attention towards the numinous, to embody in his discourse that itch to 
say something more by the phenomenal than the phenomenal says in 
itself, is by so arranging his discourse 'over a stretch' that one's 
expectation of finding a resting place within his language is undermined 
even as the restlessness itself is produced. Derrida's concepts as he 
presents them often do not come with a conceptual glue which will 
hold them together; yet, they give an appearance of cohesion. 
For example, in a passage such as the following, taken from 
'Differance', one of his seminal articles on deconstruction, 19 there is in 
effect a reversal of the method we saw in Wordsworth, insofar as 
Derrida's rhetoric 'scatters' a singleness of interpretation which is 
apparently offered, into several possible meanings from which the 
reader must find the sense which best suits her or him. 
For us, differance remains a metaphysical name, and all the names 
that it receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical. And 
this is particularly the case when these names state the determination 
of differancc as the difFerence betwen presence and the present 
(Anwescen/ Anwescend), and, above all, and is already the case when 
they state the determination of differance as the difference of Being 
and beings. "Older" than Being itself, such a differance has no name in 
our language. But we "already know" that it is unnameable, it is not 
provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or 
received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another 
language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because 
there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of 
Being, not even that of "differance," which is not a name, which is not 
a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of 
differing and deferring substitutions. 
There is no name for it; a proposition to be read in its platitude. 
This unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no name could 
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approach: God, for example. This unnameable is the play which makes 
possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures 
that are called names, the chains of substitutions of names in which, 
for example, the nominal effect differance is itself enmeshed, carried 
off, reinscribed, just as a false entry or a false exit is still part of the 
game, a function of the system. 
Derrida argues here against the idea that any Substance, supposed 
to be ultimately real, has an existence beyond its name. And this, he 
suggests, holds as much for the name he coins to mark a gap between 
name and referent - 'differance' - as it does for any other of those 
names thought in the past to signify this Substance: 'Being', or "God, 
for example". This is, in essence, in a famous and early form, Derrida's 
statement of the impossibility of a 'transcendental signified' - of any 
referent which exists enduringly beyond the play of language, and 
beyond the human consciousness which uses language to project its 
conceptual play as 'reality'. 
But, at the very moment that he tries to deny the possibility of 
anything existing beyond a conceptual, linguistically-based play, and by 
the very same rhetorical move, Derrida invites a return of the 
transcendent. He says, on the one hand, "That there is not a proper 
essence of differance at this point, implies that there is neither a Being 
nor truth of the play of writing such as it engages differance". But also, 
and equally, "This unnameable is the play which makes possible 
nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures which are 
called names". 
By this second statement he establishes a factor, pre-nominal, and 
constant (since it generates naming, and meanings which are 'relatively' 
unitary) which feels as though it does possess, 'in-itself', a substantial 
existence prior to language. He has, I think, re-established in the form 
of that very word by which he would deny Substance - differance - the 
sense of a constant prior to expression, one which furthermore gathers 
to itself the mystique proper to that which exists but cannot be 
specified. 
So that here - going to Bataille, once more - a •pre-existing 
disposition to play which makes language possible as a unitary 
structure but which cannot be named•, functions, I propose, very 
much in the manner of those Transcendental Signifieds - 'Being', 'God' 
and the rest - Derrida has been using this passage to argue against. 
The rhetorical moves made in this passage deconstruct the proposition 
it has been set up to argue against, in classic 'blindness and insight', De 
Manian, fashion. 
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One might also point out, taking this deconstruction further, that 
one can hardly have the notion of a 'false exit/entry', which Derrida 
promotes as indicating the operations of language, without invoking the 
notion of an entrance and an exit which is true. The very figure 
Derrida finds to describe the Substanceless, non-transcendent nature of 
language, that is to say, once again, in his use of this figure of speech, 
necessarily invokes a feeling for, an idea of, what is true and real. 
Derrida in such passages either undermines one's expectation that 
any such unity can be linguistically achieved by means of the 'formal 
deconstruction' of the sort he uses in Glas or Nietzsche's Spurs, or he 
sets up - willy-nilly - a principle of no-principle in pitching his rhetoric 
against itself - rhetoric against argument operating as a kind of 
extended koan - as in the passage from 'Differance'. 
This makes in me, not an anxiety in knowing that certainty is 
impossible, but rather the feeling that a certain amount of important 
conceptual clutter, even of nonsense, has been shifted aside (compare 
with Wittgenstein's description of philosophy as "the making of covert 
nonsense obvious"). To that degree, consciousness itself is clarified. 
The effect of this can be to direct the reader to the other side of the 
ordinary human, a movement of attention which has common ground 
with descriptions of the numinous given by writers who have tried to 
celebrate its existence, and away from the universe as a self-enclosed 
linguistic production. I am suggesting that the deconstructionist 
moment might not necessarily beat a path to Nietzschean aporia at all, 
but, if it is permitted to do so, might rather bring us to an ante-room 
of the sort from which mystics of various types have declared 
themselves in relation to what lies beyond language. 
University of Singapore 
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